
IR 225: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Semester: Fall 2009

Lectures: Tue, Thu: 09:40—10:55 AM

Location: Morey 504

Office Hours: Tue./Thur. 11 AM-12 PM

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COURSE DESCRIPTION

This lecture analyzes the logic and practice of international negotiations. What strategies do states use? What works, what does not and why? And, how can we learn from theory and history to advise current negotiators? The course relies heavily on game-theoretic notions but does not require any mathematical background. Commitment, credibility and bargaining power are some of the concepts that will be central in this class. Applications to the real world (WTO, crisis negotiations) will be particularly emphasized to illustrate the theoretical notions introduced.

GRADING

<i>Examination</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Weight</i>
Midterm	Short questions (6) + long question (1)	25%
Final exam	Short questions (10) + long question (1)	30%
Paper	Max 1000 words (about 4 double spaced pages). Topic to be discussed with me.	25%
Practice Negotiations	Negotiations in pairs or groups, outside of class. Details TBA.	15% + bonus
Participation	Attendance / Participation.	5%

Short questions aim to test your knowledge. Any fact or concept covered in the lecture or the readings can be asked. Answers need only be a few sentences long, half a page at most.

Examples of short questions:

- What is a reservation point?
- How are decisions adopted at the World Trade Organization?

- Was the Cuban missile crisis negotiation successful?

Long questions will test your understanding of concepts and their relationships.

Examples of long questions:

- When do negotiations break down?
- Does more power necessarily lead to more gains in a negotiation?
- Do international institutions help or hinder successful negotiations?

Practice Negotiations. Regularly, I will ask you to conduct practice negotiations over an assigned issue. You will be assigned a partner or a group, and these negotiations will take place between lectures. They will be conducted by email (only) between participants. I must be included in each email (cc me at tchade@ur.rochester.edu). IMPORTANT: emails MUST follow these rules:

- Use the following subject line: “IR 225 – Negotiation #x – bargainerA / bargainerB”
- Cc me on ALL communications regarding this negotiation. You will NOT be graded on the content of these exchanges, but you must still cc me. Failure to do so will result in a lower grade.

At the end of each negotiation, each of you must submit a **short summary** of the negotiation process, as seen from your point of view. In particular, you should describe your prior beliefs about the other’s preferences, how you updated these beliefs, and what your strategy was. These will form the basis of your grading for this section (15%). In addition, a total of 10 bonus point will be allocated to your performance in these negotiations. Details will be explained in class.

Paper. Details will be discussed in class. The topic of your paper is of your choosing, but it must be discussed with me beforehand.

Participation Grade. This grade will mostly be determined by your attendance. Failure to attend must be justified by a medical certificate or other appropriate documents. Your participation in class and your answers to the questions I may ask will also be taken into account.

TEXTBOOKS / READING MATERIAL

The following three textbooks provide good introductions to and overviews of international negotiations. They are all available on reserve at the library (2 hour limit) and have been ordered at the University of Rochester.

- Odell, J. (2000). *Negotiating the World Economy*. Cornell University Press.
- Watkins M. & Susan Rosegrant (2001). *Breakthrough International Negotiation: How Great Negotiators Transformed the World's Toughest Post-Cold War Conflicts*. Jossey-Bass.
- Schelling. 1967. *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press.

COURSE OUTLINE

#	Date	Title	Readings
1	09/01	Introduction	
2	09/03	Negotiations: past and present	Watkins, ch. 1, 14
3	09/ 08	Two parties, one issue	Watkins, ch. 2, Odell ch. 2 (all)
4	09/10	Two parties, multiple issues	Odell, ch. 7 Odell, ch. 4, 5
5	09/15	Multiple parties, multiple issues	Dupont, Christophe. "Negotiation as Coalition Building." <i>International Negotiation</i> . Vol. 1, 1996. pp. 47-64.
6	09/17	Agenda and Timing	
7	09/22	Two-level negotiations	Odell, ch. 6, pp. 109-128 (Optional: Odell, ch. 8)
8	09/24	Preferences and utility	Davis, Morton. 1997. <i>Game theory: a nontechnical introduction</i> . Dover Publications. Chapter 4
9	09/29	Power	Schelling, ch. 1
10	10/01	Commitment	Schelling, ch. 2, 3
11	10/06	Coalitions	Watkins, ch. 11, 12
12	10/08	Getting to the table	Watkins, ch. 3, 9, 10
13	10/13	Culture and negotiations	Watkins, ch. 4 + 5
14	10/15	Security negotiations I: Avoiding war	Fearon, James. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War". <i>International Organization</i> . 49(3):379--314
15	10/20	Security negotiations II: Preventing and ending wars	Watkins, ch. 13
16	10/22	Security negotiations III: Mediation	Watkins, ch. 6 + 7
17	10/27	Review session	Muthoo. 2000. A non-technical introduction to bargaining theory. <i>World Economics</i> . 1(2):145--166
18	10/29	MIDTERM	

19	11/03	Economic negotiations I	Odell, ch. 1 (in particular p. 9-17)
20	11/05	Economic negotiations II	Odell, ch. 3
21	11/10	Economic negotiations III	
22	11/12	Multilateral negotiations I	Hampson. 1995. <i>Multilateral Negotiations</i> . Ch. 7, 8 (p. 168-252)
23	11/17	Multilateral negotiations II	Hampson. 1995. <i>Multilateral Negotiations</i> . Ch. 7, 8 (p. 168-252)
24	11/19	Multilateral negotiations: Regional	Cameron, M., Tomlin B. <i>The Making of Nafta: How the Deal Was Done</i> . Cornell University Press. Ch. 1 and 2, p. 1—51.
25	11/24	Negotiating human rights	Hafner-Burton, E.M. and Tsutsui, K. 2005. Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises. <i>American Journal of Sociology</i> 110(5):1373--1411
26	11/26	<i>Thanksgiving break</i>	
27	12/01	Negotiating the environment	Sebenius, James. 1984. <i>Negotiating the Law of the Sea</i> . Boston: Harvard University Press. Ch. 1, 2.
28	12/03	Negotiating with terrorists	Neuman. 2007. Negotiating with Terrorists. <i>Foreign Affairs</i> (Jan. Feb. 2007). Pape, Robert. 2003. The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. <i>American Political Science Review</i> . 97(3):343-361
29	12/08	Ethnic and civil wars	Walter, Barbara. 2003. The critical barrier to civil war settlement. <i>International Organization</i> . 51(3):335—364 Bring two blue books
30	12/10	Concluding session / Review	Odell, ch. 9, 10
	12/ 18, 4:00 PM	FINAL EXAMINATION	

LECTURE POLICIES

LATE WORK POLICY

The following penalties may be applied for late work:

- Work submitted 1-2 calendar days AFTER its due date may be graded down a maximum of 10%.
- Works submitted 3-6 calendar days AFTER its due date may be graded down a maximum of 20%.
- Work submitted 7-21 days AFTER its due date may be graded down a maximum of 30%.
- Work submitted more than 21 days AFTER its due date will receive an automatic zero.

PAPER SUBMISSIONS

Your paper should include:

A title page with an abstract. This page should contain: the paper's title and your name; the date, course number and the name of the assignment (e.g., "Final paper").

The paper itself should be double-spaced, 1" margins on all sides, 12 pt font size, and right-justified. There should be no spaces between paragraphs within the paper.

A references page (APA style). Sources should be alphabetized by the author's last name (or, for sources without authors, by the first letter in the title).